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Abstract 
Australia's acceptance of refugees has a long and controversial history. As a nation, we have at 
times accommodated and accepted multitudes of various individuals of differing faiths, 
ethnicity and cultures into our society. Australia is indeed a cosmopolitan community of 
indigenous and immigrant Australian citizens that have displayed periods of welcoming 
refugees from war-torn states as under Malcolm Fraser's leadership in the late 1970s. 
Concurrently, we have actively discriminated, sometimes implicitly, although not always, 
against certain immigrants, including refugees from China and Papua and New Guinea during 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. The community's perception of refugees has often curtailed 
the more liberal accommodation of foreigners in need of refuge. The refugee policy and its 
wholesale delivery by the government of the day has the ability to change and influence the 
zeitgeist through government leadership, or can alternatively appeal to the popular interest 
and continue to be voter orientated. 
This thesis compares and contrasts the periods of the Bob Hawke and Paul Keating 
administrations (1983-1996) and the John Howard administration (1996-2007). It investigates 
this epoch to analyse similarities and differences between the Labor and Coalition 
governments with respect to rhetoric and policy associated with refugees. Case study 
examples are utilised to compare how Hawke and Keating as well as Howard issued rhetoric 
and applied policy. 
This study tested three main similarities between the Labor and Coalition governments. First, 
within policy, both governments continued to uphold Australia's refugee intake quotas to a ten 
per cent margin of the overall per annum immigration intake. In spite of this accomplishment, 
more serious problems of resettlement issues were poorly administered by both parties. 
Secondly, foreign policy and economic policy were major considerations for conservative and 
centre-left governments during their respective periods of incumbency. These policies often 
had a direct affect on refugee issues concerning who and how many refugees may be admitted 
into Australia. Thirdly, the rhetoric employed by both party governments generally appealed to 
their respective constituents although actual affects on policy implementation were marginal. 
These findings illustrate research outcomes worthy of attention. Although Australia has a good 
record in comparison to other net-receiving refugee countries, scope remains to increase the 
nation's quota for future refugee admittance (on or offshore), in line with Australia's economic 
prosperity. There has been, at select times, a window of opportunity for political leaders to 
show strong leadership on this front. However, pragmatism driven by a following of public 
opinion has tended to outweigh leaders interest in following such a course. Both, Hawke and 
Howard had times in which they could have demonstrated elite moral fortitude and taken the 
step of accepting wider and more numerous refugee quotas. Foreign policy implications and 
domestic constituent considerations have lent their respective weight on the leaderships' 
decisions. Hawke and Howard have become more pragmatic and less convictional as their 
terms in office progressed.· 
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Introduction 
Despite public rhetoric to the contrary, there are a large number of similarities between the 
policy approaches to refugee issues by the two major parties in modern Australian politics. 
Convergence of political parties' constituency's and the 'battle for the middle ground' are 
flourishing within Australian politics and the microcosm example of how this has impacted on 
refugee policies is worthy of further investigation. Differences in policy, discussed below, are 
primarily concerned with two aspects that include ideological divergence, individualism and 
collectively, and ministerial intervention through leaders partiality to particular refugees. 
The majority of contemporary opinion and research into refugee policy has highlighted the 
severity of the Coalition's response to refugees in the last decade1 {Brennan, 2003, pp. 47- 57; 
Crock, Saul, Dastyari, 2006, pp. 113 - 122; Mares, 2002, pp. 121 - 133; Probyn, 2009}. From 
this general consensus of academic and journalistic opinion, this thesis sets out to compare 
and contrast the ALPs policy and rhetoric to ascertain if this opinion can be authenticated. The 
thesis aims to prove this assertion is in fact a fallacy and realistically there is very little 
divergence between ALP and Coalition policy on refugees. 
The focus of this thesis is the similarities and differences associated with refugee policy and 
party rhetoric between the governments of Hawke/Keating and Howard. Three principle areas 
of the topic- boat people, visa categories and mandatory detention- will provide the basis of 
comparison, as these areas of interest are the fundamentals of refugee policy and its 
associated rhetoric and spin. Various case studies will be utilised within this discussion to 
compare the two parties' policies and associated rhetoric. 
The Australian public debate covering the multiple aspects of refugees is often a vexing 
contemporary issue. The array of frequently interchangeable words and expressions employed 
by the press often contributes to public confusion and misunderstanding of an already 
complex issue2• To nullify any such misunderstandings in the context of this thesis, the author 
seeks to define some key words and therefore ensure clarity of expression when discussing 
this issue. 
1 Alan Moir's and Bill Leak's political satire captures the cartoonists' impression of the leadership's 
policies and rhetoric (See Brennan, 2003, p. 51). 
2 ian Ward (2002, pp. 22 -23) argues the journalistic use of the term 1illegal immigrants' to describe the 
asylum seekers on board the Tampa framed the public debate that favoured the incumbents position. 
See Romano, (2007, p. 245) for examples of journalist use of terminology. 
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Table 1.1 Terminologies 
Serial Terminology 
1 Asylum seeker 
2 Refugee status 
3 Refugee policy 
4 Mandatory detention 
An asylum seeker is an applicant seeking potential refugee status (Jupp, 1994, p. 66). It must 
be noted here that an asylum seeker is not deemed a 'refugee' until their status has been 
evaluated and their claims substantiated in reference to the United Nations High Commission 
for Refugees (UNHCR) 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol. Asylum seekers entering 
Australia without a visa do so unlawfully (Brennan, 2003, p. 5). This is expressed according to 
Section 13, Paragraph 14, of the Migration Act 1958. To avoid misunderstanding, a person 
within the migration zone prior to 1994 being an illegal entrant; is now referred to as an 
unlawful non-citizen (Migration Act, 1958, s.14). This category is normally represented 
rhetorically by the expression 'boat people' as well as referring to individuals that stay within 
Australia past the limit of their visa entitlement. Asylum seekers entering the Australian 
migration zone with a visa are referred to as 'lawful non-citizens' (Migration Act, 1958, s.13). 
This category is represented normally by students and tourists arriving by air, who then may 
claim asylum in Australia. An additional note is that asylum seekers are not differentiated by 
the means or mode of transportation to the Australian continent. In other words, the crucial 
distinction that requires explicit illustration is that it is unlawful to enter Australia without an 
appropriate visa according to Australian law, but it is not (emphasis added) morally or ethically 
unreasonable to do so. Therefore, mandatory detention is required for administrative 
purposes only and should not be viewed as punitive in implementation3 • 
Refugee status is defined according to the 1951 Convention: 
as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of 
a particular social group or political opinion; is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the 
3 Critics (Maley, 2004, p. 151) (Mares, 2001, pp. 56 - 58) have stated that this policy is punitive in 
implementation. The main assertion to justify this punitive labelling is the treatment of asylum seekers 
whilst they are being held in detention and its /human cost' (Davies, 2007, p. 6). 
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country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (Article 1A, [2]). 
Australia's accession to the 1967 Protocol in 1973 effectively expanded the terms that defined 
refugee status. Article I, paragraphs 2 and 3 removed the restrictions placed on state 
signatories of the 1951 Convention. Paragraph two omitted the time restriction which was 
stipulated in the 1951 Convention that meant events occurring before 1 January 1951 were a 
requirement for refugee status in acknowledgement that more recent events have caused 
substantial refugee flows, commonly termed 1push factors'. In addition, paragraph three 
removes any geographical restrictions placed on signatories of the original Convention. Thus 
not only European origin refugees may be considered for asylum and refuge (Cutts, 2004, p. 6; 
see Figure 1.2 below). 
In light of the international obligations highlighted above, it is important to note that 
recommendation E (echo) of the convention embodies the ethos and spirit of the convention 
that urges this formal status as a bench mark. Countries ratifying or acceding to the convention 
should interpret this as the minimum standard for the treatment and processing of refugees 
(McMaster, 2002, p. 33). 
Refugee policy is the portion of the larger immigration portfolio that is administered by the 
federal government that explicitly pertains to humanitarian and person in exile policies. 
Burnside, (2007, p. 252) however draws an apt distinction that he expresses succinctly as: 
Immigration policy is a reflection of demographic, social and economic 
considerations which cause a country to say they would like this many people, or 
of this or that skill base, this or that ethnic origin. Refugees have quite a different 
claim to our hospitality. Refugees are fleeing persecution, torture or death in a 
place which is unsafe, and they seek [our] protection. 
It is critical to define this distinction, as visa categories will be discussed in Chapter three. For 
the period under review, three basic categories of immigration policy exist. These consist of 
family, skilled and humanitarian (Lloyd, 1993, p. 77). Each category has variations of sub-
categories that fluctuate in actual intake numbers and quotas set by the Department of 
Immigration (see Figure 1.1 below). Thus, putting the family and skilled categories to one side, 
the humanitarian category is divided into three components under the Hawke administration 
which included a Convention refugee total (UNHCR vetted offshore refugees), a special 
humanitarian total (persons who do not meet the strictly 1951 convention parameters for 
refugee status) and a special assistance program (introduced in 1991 and removed in 1996 to 
deal with unique events - such as the Kosovo crisis). It is important to note that a specific 
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category was not set aside for 'onshore arrivals', this inadvertently demonstrates the 
diminutive size of this unpredictable element within the humanitarian category. Howard's 
term in office saw the abolition of the final category in 1996, leaving just the first two 
aforementioned categories in use (Jupp, 2003, p. 84). 
Figure l.llmmigration and Refugee Policy Categories 
Department of 
Immigration and 
Citizenship (DIC) 
Immigration Policy 
(Economic and 
Family) 
1951 Convention 
Refugee Category 
Special 
Humanitarian 
Category 
Special Assistance 
Programme (1991-
1996) 
Various schemes 
and categories 
Mandatory detention is authorised by the Migration Act 1958 (Migration Act_ 1958, s.189). 
Part 2, Division 7, Section 189 outlines the circumstances that permit the detention of unlawful 
non-citizens who are either, seeking to access the migration zone or, are within the migration 
zone by an authorised officer. Section 176 states that: 
This Division is enacted because the Parliament considers that it is in the national 
interest that each non-citizen who is a designated person should be kept in 
immigration detention until he or she: 
(a) leaves Australia; or 
(b) is given a visa. 
Therefore under the Migration Act 1958 unlawful non-citizens (referred to above as 
designated person) may be detained until their claim has been substantiated or revoked. If 
substantiated they are to be issued a visa and released into the community. If revoked they are 
to be deported from Australia as soon as practicable (McMaster, 2002, p. 67). 
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Figure 1.2 International and Australian legislation Timeline 
1989 Migration 
Act amendment 
1958 Migration 2001 Border 
1950 Act 
and regulations Protection Act 
I I J 
UN 1951 UN 1967 1992 legislation 
Convention Protocol introduced~ Fiscal 
restructure of 
department 
Academic and legislative interpretations are necessary to orientate the reader in light of the 
author's viewpoint. Newspaper articles, internet blogs and television sound bites all commonly 
contain these terms; however, at times they are taken out of context within the Australian 
press. 
The current financial downturn (global financial crisis) for the developed world which 
encompasses huge monetary shortfalls and billions of dollars that are earmarked for the 
United Nations from donor countries (Australia included) presents a dilemma for current 
international refugee programs. These financial obligations are required by international 
organisations such as UNHCR for ongoing coordination of underdeveloped and developing 
country refugee resettlement plans. This reduction, by contributing countries, in fiscal support 
will have a detrimental effect on global UN operations. In 2009 alone; twelve humanitarian 
camps were closed in Zimbabwe (UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency, 2009). 
Secondly, with climate change displacing indigenous people of the pacific rim due to rising sea 
levels, the desertification of China making vast areas uninhabitable, the enlarging arid areas of 
Africa (sub Sahara) reducing the bread basket of the world; and subsequently, the continued 
expediential population growth in the underdeveloped and developing world will undoubtedly 
have the potential to place more stress on certain developed nations. Historically, Australia, 
Canada and the United States of America have accepted large numbers of UNHCR 
humanitarian refugees for permanent resettlement (Phillips, 2009, p. 3). 
Furthermore, the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan, post 2006, and the continuing 
humanitarian crisis in Darfur linked with the ongoing statelessness of Somalia are continuing to 
displace and marginalise groups in need of resettlement. As one case example highlights, 
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contemporary reports show that Iraq has an infancy death rate close to the highest in the 
world4 (Global Health Atlas, 2009}; also one in every three people of Iraq's population does not 
have access to clean drinking water (Singer, 2007}. If so, due to geographical proximity, 
refugee flows and asylum seeker surges may well result in external pressure on Australia to 
accept a greater number of potential political, religious, and economic refugees. 
Refugees, asylum seekers and 'persons of concern', a catch all category that encompasses 
UNHCR designated individuals; continue to grow in numbers annually. Phillips (2009, p. 4} 
quotes UNHCR statistics in 2009 that demonstrate the expediential growth in displaced people 
around the globe. In 1951, there was an estimated 1.5 million refugees internationally; in 
1980, this figure had grown to 8.2 million. In 2007, UNHCR estimates that there are 11.7 
million refugees worldwide. Despite international efforts to mitigate and reduce numbers of 
'people of concern', their numbers continue to increase and force 'receiving' countries such as 
Australia to adapt their policies (Phillips, 2009, p. 4}. 
The methodology of comparative analysis has been utilised to explore the proposed 
hypothesis. This method was chosen as it allows the author to compare and contrast both the 
policy and rhetoric within a closed universe. Various cases, that demonstrate real world 
examples, are thus able to be juxtaposed from within the given timeframe between 1983, the 
first year of Hawke's Labor government, until 2007 and the conclusion of Howard's tenure in 
public office. 
This primary system was developed by John Stuart Mill in his study 'A System of Logic (1843}'. 
Kernan (2008, p. 72} paraphrases this concept as 'the basic idea is that the comparing of cases 
can be used to detect commonalities between cases and variables'. This study will utilise both 
an assessment of the similarities and discuss the differences found between the parties' under 
consideration. Both similarities and differences will be considered; this is due to the need to 
expose the reader to both party convergence and divergence in respect to both policy and 
rhetoric. So, conclusions will be drawn from observed inferences from both common and 
different case study outcomes. 
To reach a valid and comprehensive conclusion, the 'art of case comparison, which includes 
what, when and how to compare' will rely on the author's diversity of case selection to draw 
4 Andrew Buncombe of the UK newspaper, The Independent reports that the growth of infant mortality 
in Iraq over the last decade has been growing at higher rates than sub-Sharan Africa due to the two 
conflicts and the consequent economic sanctions. Afghanistan has the second highest infant mortality 
rate in the world (Buncombe, 2007). 
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reasonable conclusions that can be generally applied across the topic (Keman, 2008, p. 64). To 
ensure accuracy in comparing selected cases, the author has taken note of external forces that 
may affect case selection such as; the state of the economy and parochial cultural sensitivity. 
However; a caveat must be expressed that, due to the extent of the time period under review, 
some variations in circumstance have been acknowledged, but omitted from this study. 
The major results of this study show that there is a continued willingness for party policy 
convergence in regards to the refugee issue despite the use of rhetoric and spin stating the 
contrary. Contemporary refugee policy continues to be an issue that is mutually supported by 
both major Australian political parties. 
The strong rhetoric displayed by the Coalition in contrast to the more reduced levels of 
rhetoric displayed by the ALP has had little effect on the numbers of asylum seekers admitted 
to Australia as bona fide 1951 Convention Refugees. Furthermore, rhetoric associated with 
refugee policy is linked with parties' constituents and has popular appeal built into its delivery. 
Thirdly, changes that have occurred to policy that have been impacted on by external factors 
(interest groups, economic climate, foreign/international relations) have been accompanied 
with larger amounts of rhetoric or political spin. This is, in part, due to the growth of the 
public relations sector and the management of political messages to the public. 
This comparison has also highlighted the tendency for political leaders to moderate their 
inherent convictions to more pragmatic ideals as their term in office grew. Pragmatism is 
displayed by both leaders' approaches to refugee policy late in their respective terms. 
Examples illustrate Max Weber's theory of leadership ethos development (Anson, 1991, p. 64). 
Chapter One analyses the history and development of Australian Refugee policy. It traces the 
development of bipartisan policy and the associated party rhetoric from the period of 
Australia's acceptance of responsibility in 1954 until Australia's late twentieth century change 
of government. It highlights and signposts the implicit expressions of Australians attitude 
towards refugees and assisted immigrants as well as drawing attention to major political 
turning points in history that have influenced modern policy. Chapter Two analyses the most 
prominent differences between the major political parties. Howard's strong rhetoric is 
compared with Hawke's. For example, Howard's rhetoric is focused on border security and 
national sovereignty and therefore often sidelines the resettlement and humanitarian 
component of official party policy. Alternatively, Hawke's rhetoric is complex, in that he was 
seen as sympathetic towards Chinese students in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square 
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massacre in 1989 and decisively harsh to what he saw as Cambodian economic refugees in 
1991. The comparison of media management and party rhetoric again signifies the 
convergence of the parties under review. Chapter Three examines the public policy of 
refugees within immigration policy. Policy is continuing to enjoy bipartisan support. Both 
major parties ascribe to the continuance of initial mandatory detention for administrative 
reasons. In addition, refugee intake levels, of approximately ten per cent of the immigration 
quota, have remained steady under both parties. Off shore processing of refugees is the 
preferred method of refugee arrival and coincided with state based initiatives that administer 
and accommodate new arrivals into the community. 
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Chapter One 
Historical Policy and Rhetoric: Towards Refugee Acceptance 
Introduction: 
Contextualising Australia's historical track record is essential to understanding contemporary 
policy and party rhetoric. By doing so, we can recognise patterns, commonalities and 
differences more readily. Some of these issues are reoccurring; they are prominent in both the 
historical narrative of our refugee policy and the contemporary debate, and therefore warrant 
specific mention. They include employment, foreign affairs and the mass media. 
This chapter examines three distinct periods leading up to the post 1983 acceptance of people-
in-need for immigration and humanitarian entry into Australia as defined by numerous 
academics (Jupp, 2002, pp. 5 - 37; Neumann, 2005, pp. 15 - 42; Lusher, 2007, pp. 9 - 21). 
Firstly, the era between 1954 and 1966 shows the rubric and attitude associated with the 
White Australia Policy. Secondly, the epoch between 1966 and 1973 expresses the gradual 
changes to policy and opinion that followed global change in attitudes towards non-
Europeans. Following this period of contestation, an analysis of policy and style takes a critical 
look at how Australia adapted and transformed its objectives to meet contemporary outlooks, 
including the process of abolishing the White Australia Policy {1973-1983). The chapter 
concludes with a brief analysis of Australia's record in relation to refugee advocate groups 
prior to the main period under review in this thesis {1983- 2007). 
Milieu to Australia's Refugee Strategy: 1901- 1954 
Linklater {2008, p. 544) describes the concept of political community as a group of members 
that are bound together by loyalty and trust. Common linkage to a shared past and experience, 
through economic hardship or warfare, is often the core element that provides social and 
political integration within a community. Linklater also advocates that members of a 
community prefer to share political power and material resources within their own group, 
thereby circumventing non-members. In correlation with this concept of political community is 
the definition of what constitutes identifiable boundaries to a given community. In the current 
era of the pre-eminence of nation states and nationalism, political communities associate the 
extent of their responsibilities with national borders. In Australia's case, these are readily 
identifiable. Although extensive, Australia's borders do not constitute a contiguous landmass 
with a neighbouring country or political community. Linklater {2008, p. 154) argues that 
citizens of one political community should extend their moral and ethical responsibility beyond 
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their nation's borders and share 'duties and obligations towards non-citizens as they do 
towards their fellow citizens'. This concept can be demonstrated in the Australian context by 
our accession to both the United Nations 1951 Convention and the United Nations 1967 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (United Nation High Commission for Refugees 
[UNHCR], n.d.). 
The prelude of immigration policy prior to Australia joining the international community's 
formal acknowledgement of refugees sheds light on the continuity of the White Australia 
Policy. Parliamentary discussions during the turn of the century over immigration policy 
concerned a number of issues that resonate in the contemporary public debate. Lawrence 
(2007, p. 177) quotes Western Australia's premier, Sir John Forrest, during the 1901 debates 
over the introduction of the bill and subsequent Immigration Restriction Act 1901: 
We desire that this country shall not be overrun with races whose sympathies, 
manners and customs and religion are not ours. There is another reason ... There 
are millions of them, and if we do not place some restrictions on them, they will 
overrun the country. 
This quote raises two perceived threats to the Australian nation. Firstly, the notion of 
'otherness', note the use of us, we, them. Secondly, the idea of a large amount of foreign 
people wishing to reside in Australia. The debate focused on immigrants' racial inferiority, 
their immorality, their non-Christian religious background and fear that the 'other' would not 
integrate into the existing communitl. 
Furthermore, this rhetoric was not accompanied by any official treaties, agreements or 
provisions recognising the needs of disadvantaged, often disillusioned and desperate displaced 
persons. With no official recognition and little to no foreign public empathy, migration of 
repressed individuals was extremely limited. In fact, Neumann (2004, p. 15) highlights the 
extremely low number of non Anglo Saxon people arriving in Australia within the first three 
decades after federation {1901-1931). White Australia Policy migrants excluded, Australia only 
accepted some two thousand Jewish migrants, two thousand White Russian migrants and a 
little over 23,000 anti-fascist Italian migrants prior to. the 1930s mass exodus of Jews from 
5 Comparatively, The United States of America and Canada displayed correlation with Australia's 
immigration program. Both illustrated a preference for British and west European migration and 
eventually widened the intake to include southern and eastern Europeans. Levels of Asian immigration 
were restricted with conservatives worried about the preserving the existing monocultural English 
ethos. Public debates also included various levels of social Darwinism during the early twentieth century 
(See Parkin and Hardcastle, 1993, pp. 42- 48). 
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Western Europe. A direct example of the rhetoric expressed above was demonstrated by the 
Department of Interior in 1938. With official concerns mounting with the number of Jewish 
applicants requesting visas, the Department of Immigration amended its application forms to 
specifically denote if applicants were ethnically Jewish. This administrative detail and the 
aforementioned debates illustrate formal concern over who was entering Australia at this very 
early stage of our national history. 
A Bipartisan White Australia Policy: 1954- 1966 
Although the White Australia Policy was the cornerstone of the Federation's immigration 
program, other factors shaped and formed Australia's response to Europe's post war refugee 
crisis in 1947. The core roots of this Australian policy following the Second World War derived 
from two main factors: sentiment that Australia must grow its population in order to maintain 
its security, aptly described in 1938 by Governor-General Lord Gowrie as 'populate or perish' 
(Neumann, 2004, p. 16); and a failure by the government to attract enough Anglo-Celtic 
immigrants which lead to a widening of ethnic origins allowed entry under immigration 
programs. 
Assisted migration arrangements with Italy, Germany, Greece and Austria were an effective 
method to achieve the aim of populating to avoid perishing. By expanding their search criteria 
to include a limited number of Jews and 'Baits' - displaced Europeans from the Baltic states 
and 'escapees' - Eastern Europeans fleeing the communist wave gained entry to Australia. 
Australia resettled more than a quarter of a million refugees in the first fifteen years following 
the Second World War; second only to the USA for this period {Neumann, 2004, p. 43). Two 
examples of Australia's commitment to resettlement include: accepting anti-communist 
refugees from the former Hungry, and Czechoslovakian refugees that were fleeing from 
politico-military action from existing soviet states. 
The reformist Hungarian government of Prime Minister Nagi opted to withdraw itself from the 
Warsaw Pact in November 1956. These actions lead to a Soviet crackdown that quashed the 
rebellious movement and put a conformist government in command. The resulting exodus of 
two hundred thousand Hungarians provided Australia with an opportunity to accept anti-
communist refugees. The Immigration Minister's response incorporated the resettling of 
14,000 Hungarian refugees by 1959. Furthermore, Australia admitted 6,000 Czechs and 
Slovakians following the aggression of five Warsaw Pact militaries towards Czechoslovakia in 
1968. These factors and their examples are derived from political pressure from Australia's 
existing domestic constituents. This political pressure was demonstrated by the strict 
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requirements that immigration officials imposed on refugees seeking resettlement in Australia. 
Neumann (2004, p. 81) suggests that 'non-British settlers were young, educated and healthy, 
and ideally, possessed certain racial features. Australian selection teams preferred vigorous, 
flaxen-haired, fair-skinned and blue-eyed young men and women from the Baltic States'. The 
selectors did not accept southern European and olive-skin people; they also rejected refugees 
from Yugoslavia, Morocco and Bulgaria, who often had come from the concentration camps of 
Nazi Germany. 
This distinction aptly reflects Australia's contemporary aversion to the admittance of refugees 
purely on a humanitarian record 6• New Zealand's Prime Minister at the time, Walter Nash, 
observed the following: 'the extent to which any country can receive refugees depends on the 
good will and assistance which the residents of that country are prepared to offer' (Neumann, 
2004, p. 39). This quote is in line with the realist theory that implies states rarely, if ever, act 
simply in terms of human rights considerations (Brown, 2008, p. 514) and is categorised by 
Jupp (2002, p. 63) as a period of 'nation building through assimilation'. Therefore prior to 
1951, Australia's economic interests maintained priority without a viable international treaty 
to resettle refugees on the basis of humanitarian need. 
The White Australia Policy becomes Contested Ground: 1966- 1973 
Australia's first relaxation of the White Australia policy occurred in 1966. That year saw 
immigration laws changed to allow entry of non-Europeans, and with that the beginning of the 
end of the policy. Official policy changed due to local anti-racist movements, some 
international embarrassment, and the economic impracticality of the policy (Vrachnas, 2008, 
p. 12; Documenting a Democracy, n.d.). Although policy changed slightly to accept a new visa 
category of 'non-Europeans with special skills' into Australia, strong anti-Asian/ African 
emotion still existed in Australia's formal policy. This point is illustrated by the contrast 
between Hong Kong's Chinese refugees and British nationals feeling the pressure of 
decolonisation both in South-East Asia and Africa. Initially Australia dismissed the concept that 
Chinese refugees were refugees under the protection of the UNHCR mandate7 • However, a 
6 Historical evidence demonstrates Australia's prejudicial behaviour in not accepting certain 
ethnic/religious/political background populations over other more 'suitable' sectors of the international 
community. The emphasis lies with their 'suitability' and not their basis of 'need' for state protection 
(Neumann, 2004, p. 51). 
7 Australia had not acceded to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees until 1973 and as 
such Chinese refugees were outside Australia's international legal obligations (Neumann, 2004, p. 112). 
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strong stance that Australia did not support the British colony (Hong Kong) was to be avoided 
as a self attentive Australia did not wish to draw international attention to its official 
immigration policy. The active approach applied to British immigrants leaving Kenya, Indonesia 
and Singapore, although not explicit in its delivery, was to welcome and support them via 
assisted passage and efficient handling by department officials. An important observation of 
the rhetoric used in framing official statements and media releases reflects the established 
contemporary bias. Any referral to applications for refugee status includes their suitability to 
'integrate' into Australian society. These factors often included the refugees' ability to speak 
English, their dress, bearing and appearance, and their religion. Notably, as Neumann (2007, 
pp. 32 - 50) argues in this rhetoric that officials were basing assessments on the individuals' 
ability to assimilate into the existing Australian culture and not their political, economic or 
social situation from their country of origin or of first refuge. The residing under-current began 
to be swept aside during an Australian Labor Party reshuffle in 1967 that ushered in Gough 
Whitlam and saw the removal of the 'Old Guard' led by Arthur Calwell. Calwell's attitude was 
aptly displayed by his infamous quote 'two wong's don't make a white' (Vrachnas, 2008, p. 11). 
Understanding why Australia grappled with its relaxation of the White Australia Policy is 
complex and can be best illustrated through a case example. A key note is that Australia was 
not at the time beholden to the United Nations 1967 Protocol that removed the time and 
geographical limitations from the existing international convention (Neumann, 2007, pp. 21-
29). In February 1969, eight West Papuans made a claim for asylum having reached an island 
within the Torres Strait of Australia. Recognising that some of these West Papuans were likely 
to be subjected to political repression due to their advocacy for independence from Indonesia, 
Australia granted a limited number of five year renewable residency permits rather than 
forcibly removing them back to Indonesia. However, this particular group of West Papuans 
were advised to request asylum in Papuan and New Guinea (PNG), at the time administered by 
Australia but governed from the Parliament in Port Moresby, as the Australian government 
had other considerations to take into account. These considerations included Indonesia's 
perception and relationship with Australia if officials decided to grant asylum to members of 
its community. The prime minister's policy directive was that 'there was to be no trouble with 
the Indonesians over West Irian' (West Papua) (Neumann, 2007, P. 22). By having the asylum 
seekers claim for asylum in PNG, Australian officials achieved two objectives; they removed 
the West Papuans from direct access to the Australian press and in doing so, maintained their 
positive relationship with Indonesian officials. In addition they did not compromise the existing 
White Australia Policy. This period of contestation ended with the Federal government 
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recognising wider boundaries for refugee status by acceding to the UN 1967 Protocol in 1973 
(Neumann, 2007, p. 26). Coincidently, Australia granted the territory of PNG self-governance 
just prior to acceding to the Refugee Protocol. Ministerial rhetoric at this time reflected further 
tensions within the system. The Minister for External Territories, Charles Barns, expressed the 
opinion that the West Papuans deportation to West Papua (Indonesia) should be considered as 
this option would be favourable to Australia's bilateral relationship with Indonesia. However, a 
member of his own department, Tim Besley, had noted the asylum seekers did not wish to be 
deported to PNG and therefore should not be forced against their will (likewise they should 
not be forced to return to Indonesia). This conflict within one government department 
illustrates the wider divide within the Australian Government (and society) at the time. 
Post White Australia: Developing a Refugee Policy 1973 - 1983 
The White Australia policy was officially dismantled in 1973 (Vrachnas, 2008, p. 12). The 
Immigration Minister, AI Grassby, speaking about Australia's immigration policy in Manilla 
declared in 1973: 'It is dea_d, give me a shovel and I will bury it' (Tavan, 2004, p. 564). This act 
coincided with Australia's accession of the 1967 Protocol which acknowledged the removal of 
geographical and chronological restrictions to the status of refugees implied by the 1951 
Convention. The second quarter of 1973 marked a dramatic change in Australia's policy and 
saw the introduction of a quota system for the intake of refugees8 . This realignment saw an 
arguably independent refugee policy that had been hitherto a mere subsidiary of immigration 
policy. Neumann (2004, p. 111) argues that for the first time international law guided 
Australian refugee and asylum seeker policy and not a self interested nation building policy 
that focused on population expansion implemented by a strict selection criteria method. This 
policy has continued hitherto the present day with recent data from UNHCR confirming 
Australia's continued support to international supra organisations, such as the United Nations 
and humanitarian government organisations such as AusAID. Official figures from 2006 show 
that Australia donated, (US) $13,483,764.00 to UNHCR and resettled a total of 13,400 
refugees; the second largest national commitment to resettlement of refugees behind the 
United States in the international community (United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
8 Australia's quota system refers to the nation's limit on the number of refugees accepted from all 
categories. This includes both off and onshore and any special assistance refugees. This limit is flexible 
and set by ministerial discretion, although historically it has remained at 10 per cent of the overall 
immigration figure (See Crock & Saul, 2002, pp. 9-12). 
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[UNHCR], n.d.)9 • However, Viviani (1980, pp. 28-29) displays a host of factors that determined 
policy over this mid 1970s period. Firstly, after a change of government federally in 1975, the 
Coalition still had the difficult task of structuring a policy that balanced domestic criticism and 
fear of Indochinese refugees in a period of high unemployment with regional government 
pressure to increase refugee intake. The immigration and ethnic affairs minister, Michael 
Mackellar, addressed this issue with a bilateral agreement with the United States that 
increased Australia's intake (quota) to 9,000 alongside a US agreement to increase its intake to 
25,000 in 1978/79. This appeasement of Indonesian, Malaysian and Singaporean officials 10 
coincided with both a regional tour that aimed at encouraging countries of first asylum to 'hold 
boats' in order for Australian officials to process 'in country', and strong rhetoric from the 
Australian government. This took the form of minister Mackellar announcing 'strong action' 
-
would be taken and 'long term imprisonment or deportation' could occur against so-called 
'queue jumpers'. These remarks were broadcast via Radio Australia to South East Asia as a 
deterrent to further boat departures as well as to placate domestic public opinion. 
Furthermore, the immigration minister released a statement on refugee policy. The statement 
outlined Australia's obligations towards refugees, but also stipulated the established position 
that the decision to accept refugees must always remain with the government (Viviani, 1980, 
p. 12). This statement shows firstly Australia's commitment to accept humanitarian refugees in 
line with its duties as a member of the international community, although retaining its 
sovereign right to adjust the quota of refugees accepted at any time. This period of policy 
reform continued under ian Macphee, (Mackellar's replacement) and included new visa 
categories that did not specify individual countries (Jupp, 2002, p. 186). Amnesties for visa 
over stayers, budget increases for educational assistance programs (English language) and a 
general increase in refugee settlement numbers all pointed towards a more humanitarian 
outlook for Australia's refugee policy under the Fraser Government (Jupp, 2002, p. 41). These 
machinations produced a firmer and more codified refugee policy. 
9 Total numbers of asylum seekers fleeing into Pakistan from Afghanistan far outweigh this figure 
(hundreds ofthousands in border camps are administered by UNHCR). However, these refugees are not 
being permanently resettled in that country of refuge as it is not a signatory of the UN 1951 Convention 
(Bell (et al), 2008, p. 142). 
10 Viviani (1980, p. 13) states Malaysia and Thailand, as countries of first asylum, were receiving the 
majority of the refugee flow from Vietnam. Prior to the increased quota from Australia, these countries 
were concerned with the rate of permanent resettlement to Australia. 
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After this distinct period of liberal accommodation of refugees, Geoffrey Blainey's commene1 
reflected what a variety of politicians and judges thought at the time: 'We should continue to 
welcome a variety of Asian immigrants, but they should come on our terms, through our 
choosing, and in numbers with which our society can cope' {Vrachnas, 2008, p. 14). However, 
in the face of this criticism and in reply to Professor Blainey's attack on multiculturalism in 
1984, the Labor Minister for Immigration, Mr West made slight adjustments in refugee policies 
to cater for the repressive, right wing governments of Central America. Indochinese refugees 
still dominated policy during 1983 and 1984 with 60 per cent falling into the family reunion 
category and 25 per cent falling into the humanitarian category {Jupp, 2002, p. 48). This policy 
adjustment illustrates the Hawke government's commitment to humanitarian and family 
reunion programs in refugee policy. As general immigration levels declined over this period, 
special status and humanitarian intake levels remained constant. McMaster {2002, p. 53) 
points out that the early 1980s reflected a tension between economic rationalists, concerned 
with meeting Australia's needs for growth and sustained development and those ethnic lobby 
groups supporting an altruistic approach to Australia's immigration policy. Katherine Betts 
{quoted in Jupp, 1993, p. 222) argued that immigration policy 'was to be a means, not of 
meeting Australia's own needs for defence or economic growth, but expressing humanitarian, 
internationalist and anti-racist values and, in doing so, meeting other peoples needs'. The early 
1980s contrasts Australia's elite social groups emphasising the need to be selective and 
restrictive in immigration policy, due to a period of high unemployment and economic 
downturn, and official bipartisan government policy reflecting Australia's need to 
accommodate Asian refugees in line with our international commitments and growing 
regional embedment. This period is suitably categorised by Jupp {2002, p. 63) as 'welfare 
resettlement and multiculturalism'. However, this period of general acceptance was replaced 
with an ever narrower concept of refugee policy by the West. Hanquet {1997, p. 19) argues 
that the resettlement package that had defined refugee policy for western nations from the 
1970s was gradually being replaced with policies of prevention and repatriation during the 
1990s. 
A reaction to the new government direction was the movement of a more mobilised, religious 
and non government orientated political action that advocated a desire to reverse restrictive 
11 History Professor Geoffrey Blainey argued that it was in the national interest that cultural assimilation 
should be given priority over ethnic groups of a monocultural persuasion (Betts, 1993, pp. 223- 228). 
16 
refugee policies. By the time the Hawke government had won its second election in December 
1984, the Federal government had reduced its refugee intake quota from 21,000 to just over 
11,000. In addition funding was cut, removing more than half a million dollars from the 
program (Matheson, 1987, p. 10). Research conducted by the Refugee Council of Australia in 
1986 suggested that 'mainly women and children would suffer as a result' of the budgetary 
cuts to UNHCR. Australian churches and religious agencies shifted their focus during this 
period from their traditional role of coordinating the resettlement of refugees, which they 
continued to facilitate, but also mobilised a more political non partisan approach to affect 
changes to refugee policy (Ferris, 1987, p. 5). The main initiative of these political agitations 
was to lobby the government on its plans to address the root causes of refugee situations, and 
for the government to seek 'durable solutions' to mitigate international refugee flows. The 
-
same aims and outcomes remain firmly within these lobbyist groups' mission priorities today. 
The Conference of Religious Leaders Institutes (NSW) refugee lobby kit utilises the advocacy of 
its members to achieve a more humanitarian role for policy and to additionally educate the 
Australian population on refugee issues (Conference of Leaders of Religious Institutes, 2007). 
Indeed the Australian Council of Churches and NGOs such as the Edmund Rice association 
(Rice, 2007) and the Refugee Council of Australia (The Refugee Council of Australia, 2009) have 
been staunch critics of bipartisan rhetoric commonly used in the refugee debate. 
Conclusion 
Throughout the period 1954- 1983 Australia has, at times, accepted and welcomed refugees 
escaping persecution and repression. As a collective the nation has at times deterred and 
sidelined particular refugees that have been deemed as 'illegal' or 'queue jumping' in their 
efforts to secure a peaceful future. This has been a direct result of government leadership, and 
this is paramount when dealing with international refugee crisis that develop and in shaping 
public reception and education of these events. Prime ministers and ministers have shaped 
policy in accordance with good governance and strong leadership combined with incremental 
changes in societal values. This leadership is the personification of ideological perspective, 
although it is occasionally tainted with progressive, forward thinking, breaks from normal 
traditions and at times a continued endorsement of conservative party policy. Australia has 
not been alone in its immigration policy development; the nation's agitations have been 
replicated in other nations touched by British imperial colonialism. Political rhetoric has also 
had substantial impact on the refugee debate that has often been aligned with appeasing 
regional powers or local members to mitigate international criticism and placate concerned 
voters. 
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Chapter Two 
Party Rhetoric in Contrast 
Introduction: 
Political parties are continually adapting to technological advances and the ever quickening 
media cycle. This chapter discusses the importance of media management and political spin in 
modern western society, in particular as it has been used to sell party positioning on refugee 
policies. The relevance to both the policy cycle and the election cycle is undisputed. Howard 
and Hawke utilised tough talk to emphasise their position in relation to the admittance of boat 
people, their stance on detention and their respective positions on visa categories. Their 
alignment is somewhat startling and effectively illustrates the parties' convergence and 
continued bipartisan support of refugee policy. 
An effective foreshadowing of leadership rhetoric on refugee policy took place in 1977 under 
the prime ministership of Malcolm Fraser. Due to the fallout from the regions political activism 
the then ACTU president, Bob Hawke, advocated action that would cease the flow of boats to 
Australia. He argued that '(a)ny sovereign country has the right to determine how it will 
exercise its compassion and how it will increase its population' (Errington and van Onselen, 
2007, p. 77). The implicit reference to Australia's international obligations under the UN 
Refugee Convention and Protocol displays how the union leadership is confusing Burnsides 
distinction between refugee policy and immigration policl2; however, as Hawke was calling to 
stem the flow of anti-communist refugees exiting Vietnam post the conflicts conclusion, he 
may have been playing a political card and following Whitlam's spin on right-wing refugees. 
Hawke's quotation also indicates his future tendency for oscillation in immigration and refugee 
policies (McMaster, 2002, p. 55). Howard's rhetoric at this time is also insightful. Errington and 
van Onselen (2007, p. 77) note an unconfirmed conversation that the new Coalition minister 
for business and consumer affairs had with his PM after a cabinet meeting that related to 
Australia's response to the decades (1970) peak in boat flows of asylum seekers. The relatively 
new cabinet member asked Fraser, 'You're not going to take too many of these people, ... are 
you?' Howard denies this conversation took place; he has no recollection of this discussion. 
Malcolm Fraser, however, confirms this conversation did occur in a corridor in May of 1977 
12 Burnside essentially describes the distinction between refugee policy and immigration policy as the 
former group is fleeing torture, persecution and death. They seek protection in another nation state 
under the obligations of that state to abide by international conventions providing refuge. The latter, 
reflect a nations demographic, economic and social considerations when choosing who to admit to the 
nation for its continuing economic prosperity and social composition (Burnside, 2007, pp. 252- 253). 
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following a cabinet meeting, in an interview with The Australian that coincided with the 
release of the 1977 Cabinet papers (Steketee, 2008). If Errington and van Onselen have 
recorded an accurate version of this account, one could foresee why the future PM would be 
conservative in his discussions about boat people and refugees in general. These attitudes also 
give light to the continued level of refugee admittance to Australia in the period under review. 
Politicking in Modernity: Political Messages 
Contemporary Australian politics is as much about public relations (PR) as it is about the 
pursuit of efficient public policy (Errington and Miragliotta, 2007, p. 81). The evolution of a PR 
state13, and the subsequent adaptation of politicians to new media, necessitates political spin 
(Ward, 1995, p. 177). Senior Australian journalist Michelle Grattan describes spin as - 'the 
highly professional selling of the political message that involves maximum management and 
manipulation of the media' (Grattan, 1998, p. 34). As Errington and Miragliotta (2007, p. 101) 
note: politicians and their associated media advisors are in a constant negotiation with the 
Australian press. The press, referred to as the 'fourth estate' notionally ascribe to the delivery 
of accurate and unbiased information to the Australian populace. Politicians aim to be 
represented in the best possible light to their electorates in order to be seen as in touch and 
connected to their constituents (McNair, 2007, p. 121). These two objectives do not always 
correlate and therefore an ongoing competition exists. This inherent struggle is supported by 
an interdependence that both parties rely on each other for traction. The free press provide, 
via broadcast, online and print media, the greatest coverage of political decisions and new 
policy to the Australian people (Tiffen, 2006, pp. 101 - 102). Alternatively, the government 
provides the press with its greatest source of new information for public dissemination and 
therefore drive its income source of associated advertising for commercial agencies (Howard, 
2009). Errington and Miragliotta (2007, p. 82), Grattan (1998, p. 38), Ester (2008, p. 6) and 
Ward (2002, p. 35) suggest that the equation is not equal, in that the government holds the 
upper hand in this relationship by its ability to influence how, when and what is reported by 
the media. Furthermore they raise a concern that explores the political saleability of public 
policy. They argue that 'news management has became a major preoccupation for the 
13 lan Ward expresses that 'public relations undoubtedly has had a substantial impact on the gathering 
and production of print and broadcast news'. He argues that 'many journalists are readily captured by 
the official or bureaucratic sources upon which they routinely rely on for information'. Ward advocates 
this industry evolution is aimed at 'influencing and even dictating' the news that is reported (Ward, 
1995, p.177). 
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government' and therefore requires 'important considerations' in the development of future 
policy. 
This notion of political saleability reflects the growth of such agencies as Hawke and Keating's 
NMLS or aNiMaLS, the National Media Liaison Service and the Howard's Government 
Members' Secretariat (GMS) (Barns, 2005, pp. 9-18). These consecutive elements help to, 
among other aspects, disseminate relevant political information from the incumbent. Both the 
ALP and the Coalition deny that they are purely political tools for the wholesale of partisan 
policy. Retrospective analysis from Barns (a former Liberal staffer) and critical analysis from 
academic political scientists and commentators, van Onselen and Errington counter weigh this 
party proposition. 
So, the media coverage of political debate has implications for political parties. This chapter 
highlights how the aforementioned agencies, political leaders and ministers manage and utilise 
rhetoric in order to gain electoral advantage with their constituents, advance their vision for 
Australia's future and placate foreign nations. Case study examples will illustrate how similar 
spin spans the gap of the political divide to extend party longevity. As rhetoric often precedes 
the enactment of legislation, it is useful to understand why and how elected members 
advocate certain refugee policies prior to turning our attention to actual policy comparison. 
In correlation with formal party media monitoring assets, partisan groups utilise political 
polling and focus group feedback to 'package' a policy directed at specific strengths or 
opposition weaknesses. This is a rather Machiavellian world view of politics; however, it does 
sound out and illustrate why there exists a subtle difference in party policy. This is illustrated in 
this chapter by again unpacking the rhetoric attached to individual policy decisions on both 
sides of the political divide. In discussing the rhetoric employed by both parties, it can be 
demonstrated how these tools are utilised to place their masters in the best possible light. 
Both parties have expressed tough talk on border control measures whilst in government and 
opposition, nevertheless eschewing the race debate. Mandatory detention has been and 
continues to be a required policy, however bipartisan rhetoric has been relatively low key in its 
substance and use. As noted previously, the greatest divergence can be seen in the placating 
of constituents through rhetoric associated with habitual party favourites. 
Boats, Votes and the Media 
The acuteness of the MV Tampa issue provides an excellent example of the relationship 
between media coverage and party rhetoric. John Howard had no doubt as to the power of the 
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Canberra press gallery. As Errington and van Onselen (2007, pp. 156- 159) illustrate, the public 
backlash experienced by Howard after his 1988 remarks as Opposition leader remained firmly 
embedded in the prime minister's mind.14 Taking the lead on this issue, as one benefit of 
incumbency allows, the Coalition framed the debate in terms of border protection rather than 
facing the scrutiny of elite Australian critics for refusing access to asylum seekers and possible 
refugees. This hard lined rhetoric encapsulated the government's official response to onshore 
asylum seekers. 
Border protection rhetoric is illustrated by Senator Christopher Ellison in his address to the 
Senate in August of 2001 during the second reading of the Border Protection Act 2001. The 
Coalition government's position is conceptualised by Senator Ellison statements. In her thesis, 
Every (2006, p. 168) outlines Senator Ellison's reciprocal use of the notion that the MV Tampa 
was attempting to enter 'our territorial waters' and come along side with 'our territorial land' 
without consent and even against our explicit direction to do so (Hansard, 2001, p. 26970). By 
utilising the notion of ownership, national territorial ownership, the government spokespeople 
achieved two outcomes. As mentioned in chapter one, Ellison is now drawing the public's 
attention to Linklater's (2008, p. 544) theories of identity and nationalism. Ellison reminds the 
national populace that these people are initially defying Australian sovereignty, which is a 
nation's right to admit whom it shall and remove those that it wishes in accordance with 
Australian law, and secondly drawing the nation together by expressing and emphasising our 
collective commonness (political and social integration) against a perceived or real threat. This 
framing characterised the position of the Coalition and is distinct from the ALPs associated 
rhetoric and displays a divergent point between the two parties. 
The perpetual and permanent campaign intrinsic to modern day democracies is well noted. As 
Errington and Miragliotta (2007, p. 101) explain, 'the permanent campaign is the use of the 
resources of government to promote a political party over the entirety of the parliamentary 
cycle'. An apt example of this in practice is highlighted by Errington and van Onselen (2007, p. 
301) in which a conversation is quoted between MP Jackie Kelly, the minister for Sport and 
Tourism, and the Prime Minister (PM) in late August 2001. This rhetoric appeals to her 
constituents or 'Howard battler territory' and a wider demographic so named by Howard as 
the 'decent conservative mainstream of Australia' (Errington and van Onselen, 2007, p. 304). 
Minister Kelly speaking to the PM said, 'One Nation is just chewing us up, I've lost two 
14 As leader of the Opposition, John Howard in 1988 remarked via broadcast radio that the rate of Asian 
immigration should be reduced in the interests of social harmony (Harris, 1993, p. 27). 
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branches to them; one of them is my best fund raising branch. We need to do something or I'm 
a goner.' Howard was on his way to Question Time in the House of Representatives and replied 
'Don't worry Jackie, That's all about to change.' A Dorothy Dixon question was posed to the 
PM by Teresa Gambaro, The Member for Petrie asking, 'There have been reports of a boat 
foundered in international waters necessitating a rescue at sea. Does this have any 
implications for Australia?' (Hansard, 2001, p. 30234) The PM replied with an abstemious 
tone, 'We have indicated to the Captain that permission to land in Australia will not be granted 
to this vessel'. Howard's intent was designed to reassure the public that his focus was in touch 
with Australia's sovereignty over other legalities and responsibilities of an international citizen. 
The angle taken by the Coalition on this matter appealed to MP Kelly's constituents and has 
been widely noted by academics (Mares, 2002, p. 136). 
However, the Coalition's rhetoric and strategies are by no means isolated as a solitary tool 
utilised for political expediency. The ALP has practised this art with relatively ruthless 
implementation when external factors bear on the plight of refugees. Foreign policy can have a 
dramatic effect on the rhetoric used by incumbent governments on certain refugee issues. 
The ALP Foreign Minister (1988 to 1996L Gareth Evans argued in defence of the Cambodian 
Peace Plan, supported by Prime Minister Hawke maintained the line that these refugees 
represented 'economic' refugees and therefore raised the question of validity of Cambodian 
boat people in 1989 and 1990 (Parkin, 1990, p. 332; Kneebone, 2006, p. 247). Arrivals on 
Western Australian shores drew attention to the effectiveness of the Cambodian Peace Plan 
and the subsequent repatriation of refugees to Cambodia. Added to the PM and Minister 
Evans comments on the validity of boat people as refugees can be Prime Minister Keating's 
suggestion that East Timorese refugees should go to Portugal (Mares, 2002, p. 30). This was at 
a time of cordial bilateral relationship between the PM and President Suharto of Indonesia. 
The Prime Minister, Paul Keating, openly stated on Perth radio: 'Timorese people have 
Portuguese citizenship, so, they have no refugee status ... those people still have Portuguese 
citizenship status'. These comments, as expressed by Mares (2002, p. 31) are corrosive and 
damage the public perception of valid and in particular UN convention refugees. Furthermore, 
the free press must question the motifs of politicians on these comments and should go 
deeper into related areas that explore other reasons for the political discourse expressed by 
key members of government. Mares (2002, p. 32) goes as far as stating that publicly attacking 
refugee validity is an overt political act often designed for positioning the government 
favourably in light of its foreign policy direction. The examples above illustrate rhetoric that 
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not only appeases regional foreign nationals' relationship with Australia, but fits within the 
wider direction that Keating ascribed to for Australia's future- engagement with Asia. 
Visa Categories and Ministerial Direction 
The ALP response to the Fitzgerald report commissioned in 1987 and submitted in 1988 
identifies key issue drivers for its constituents. The report states for part of its 
recommendations for time frame and program size that, 'there be a program of 150, 000 per 
annum from 1988/89 to 1990/91...That the composition of the program for the three 
years ... be as follows: i) Category A (Family Immigration) to remain self-determining, but likely 
to increase to about 40,000; ii) Category B (Refugee/Humanitarian) be increased to 15,000; iii) 
Category C (Open Category[skilled]) to form the balance of around 95,000' 15 . So, in addition to 
supporting a relatively moderate increase in the refugee/humanitarian category of 3,000 
positions, and a similar increase in the family reunion category, it also calls for a considerable 
increase in an 'open' category to specifically attract skilled and educated individuals to 
enhance Australia's economic prospects moving into the twenty-first Century (Fitzgerald, 
1988, p. 122) . A consistency in rhetoric between the parties can be noted in both the Prime 
Ministers and the Immigration Minister's responses soon after the release of this report. 
McMaster (2002, pp. 55 -59) draws the example of the arrival of a few hundred Cambodian 
boat people from 1989 to 1991, in which he notes that Hawke condemned the arrivals as 
'queue jumpers and economic refugees'. Prime Minister Hawke declared, 'let no one think that 
we're just going to stand idly by and allow others, by their autonomies action which reflects 
perhaps some unhappiness with the circumstances in which they find themselves in their 
-
country ... to determine our immigration policy'(McMaster, 2002, p. 57). As previously noted, 
this was not the first time Hawke had criticised refugees for as ACTU national president in 1977 
he publically announced that the government should 'Return Bogus Refugees' and stop them 
from 'Jumping the Queue' (Rodd, 2007, p. 36). This rhetoric was aptly supported by Hawke's 
Immigration Minister, Gerry Hand, by his statement declaring that 'if these people turned up 
they would stay confined until they were assessed' (McMaster, 2002, p. 57). Counter 
assumption or arguments that external forces mitigated the entry of these asylum seekers is 
relatively weak if not invalid altogether, due to a concomitant admittance of approximately 
30,000 Chinese students in 1989 on temporary protection visas by the Hawke government. 
Brennan (2003, p. 39) supports McMaster's position by quoting the Trade Minister, Neal 
15 Prior to the publication of Fitzgerald's report, the net immigration level reached 113,540 in 1987. This 
sum included all three categories; skilled, humanitarian and family (York, 2003, DIM lA). 
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Blewett's official correspondence in which he stated 'the boat people were going to be treated 
as illegal immigrants and repatriated'. He further draws attention to the Immigration Ministers 
Hand and Bolkus openness in parliamentary discussion of the need of deterrence as part of 
'rationale for detention'. The essential point drawn from this case example is that of bipartisan 
support of deterrence policy towards onshore asylum seekers has been repeatedly and 
explicitly advocated by both the ALP and the Coalition. 
Elections, Values and Detention 
The mid nineteenth century United Kingdom political philosopher T. Green supported the 
aspects of modern liberalism; in particular, the tenant of positive freedom (Heywood, 2003, p. 
41). Following the work of J. S. Mill, Green saw individuals possessing social responsibilities 
that emphasised having sympathy for one-another, displaying care and empathy for each other 
and that they were capable of altruism. This notion is supported by the rejection of the 
classical conception of liberalism that advocates humans are essentially 'self seeking utility 
maximisers' (Heywood, 2003, p. 59). This optimistic line of thought has been characterised as 
'Social-Liberalism'. Given this tenant of modern liberalism, if one ascribes to it, then it is of 
little wonder that the Coalition chose to define the debate on the terms it did in 2001. The 
predominant view of the Australian community supported mandatory detention and this was 
displayed though polling that suggested respondents though the government was too soft in 
its policy direction (Rodd, 2007, p. 42). 
In 1977 and just prior to another Federal election the arrival of 181 Vietnamese refugees 
aboard the Song Be stirred similar anxieties among the Australian press and public. Why was 
public opinion angled in this direction? The minister for immigration Phillip Ruddock 
strategically directed the argument of mandatory detention as attacks against people 
smugglers and the nation's need for strong border protection policies. Ruddock's tone 
emphasised that the people smugglers were 'well organised, ruthless, greedy and were 
exploiting Australia's humanity and vulnerability' (Mares, 2002, p. 110). This effectively 
bypassed any accusations that he or the government could be seen as blaming the asylum 
seekers for their own plight. The rhetoric used to demonise people smugglers focused and 
framed the debate that sought not to awaken any Australian public's notion's of Green's Social 
Liberalism. 
The Howard government's strategy was to protect our 'shared values' with strong rhetoric that 
emphasised border protection and detention of individuals that chose to threaten this notion. 
In this case, the alternative prime minister and leader of the Opposition, Kim Beazley 
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supported the Coalitions policy and his rhetoric additionally reminded the Australian public 
that had been the Australian Labor Party that had initially implemented the policy of 
mandatory detention in 1992 under a Keating administration (Rodd, 2007, p. 44). 
In addition, the prime minister played an important role in the debate surrounding the MV 
Tampa and its human cargo. Howard, when on vacation in Singapore in the 1960s, witnessed 
race riots. Errington and van Onselen (2007, p. 40) suggest this experience confirmed in 
Howard a long-established concept that cultures struggled to coexist without assimilation. This 
may have been in the back of the prime minister's mind with so many boat arrivals of unlawful 
non-citizens to Australia in 2001 (4100 approximately and the vast majority where from middle 
eastern decent). However, Howard's support for his immigration minister's stance and 
rhetoric is more likely due to the appeal this position had to his constituents which was 
dramatically reflected in national polls in August 2001. This would also explain why the ALP in 
opposition chose a me-too approach to policy on this topical election issue. 
Conclusion 
While the majority of party rhetoric exhibits similarity and continuity, there are a few 
idiosyncrasies that reflect party loyalties. These loyalties reproduce the conception of the main 
'perceived' differences in party policy. Initially both leaders, whether in government or 
opposition, have utilised strong rhetoric when advocating the case for Australia's sovereign 
rights of determination. Powerful rhetoric has also been applied to Australia's future direction 
when concerns over changes in economic and social policy dominate the media agenda. A 
tradition continued from John Forrest's speech over immigration in 1901 to John Howards 
address to Parliament in 2001 in the wake of Tampa. However, leaders words have appealed 
at times to specific constituents within the electorate that provide a support base for either 
party. The rhetoric employed has been utilised to position the government of the day in a light 
that is favourable to re-election and maintaining power. Overall, the media management 
employed to enhance electoral longevity, through its pragmatic appeal to parochial 
community values and fears, has not overtly impeded on bipartisan support for Australia's 
official refugee policy. 
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Chapter Three 
Refugee Policy: Comparing Major Party Responses 
Introduction: 
The purpose of public policy is to derive an effective method for resolving social conflicts 
(Lindblom, 1980, p. 11}. The refugee issue is a reoccurring social conflict that regularly occupies 
the policy cycle of contemporary Australian politics. If the issue is cased as a 'problem', 
boundaries can be identified and objectives defined. This turns the issue into a concern to be 
solved. This is illustrated when examining the 'Pacific Solution' during the Coalitions term in 
office: an ongoing commitment to an ongoing problem, a so called 'wicked problem' 
(Bridgman & Davies, 2004, p. 43}. However, public policy is never as simple as implementing a 
one off solution to a particular issue. 
Australia's refugee issue continues to be well supported on the Governments agenda by an 
array of forces (political, external and internal) that drive public policy. Refugee policy exhibits 
aspects of political issue drivers from both party platforms, draws continued attention from 
past and present immigration ministers and carries a great deal of historical weight in party 
policy. In addition, the refugee issue gains support from external drivers which include; 
economic forces, such as high levels of unemployment and subsequent welfare dependency 
within the community, media attention, and international relations with regional governments 
that incorporate foreign policy concerns. These two drivers are supported by the inherent, if 
somewhat invisible forces that are contained within government. These include; regular 
reviews and monitoring of existing policy, budget restrictions and expansions, and monitoring 
of other nations capabilities of dealing with refugees (Bridgman & Davies, 2004, pp. 35 - 38; 
see Figure 3.1 below: Refugee policy drivers). Although refugee policy enjoys a large quarter of 
support across all three policy drivers, political, external and internal, the refugee issue is often 
found at the front of the queue at Parliamentary Question Time when its political impact is at 
its greatest; otherwise the issue is often relegated off the agenda for more mainstream 
economic issues. 
Consultation with political elites has demonstrated how policy has been implemented by 
incremental change and not leaps and bounds. Bridgman & Davis, (2004, p. 47} describe the 
resource and time constraints on politicians to seek outcomes for items currently listed on the 
public policy agenda. The relative short attention span notated by the current and ever 
quickening media cycle places an overburdening emphasis on politicians to achieve positive 
resolutions, and achieve them quickly. A consequence of the short media and public attention 
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span is a need to develop and implement policy swiftly. The facilitation of this necessity is 
displayed by the incremental creep of policy. Critics argue that this form of policy development 
often shortcuts the process and misses best practice initiatives due to the lack of a rigorous 
and whole picture approach to policy outcomes through a lack of objectivity (Bridgman & 
Davies, 2004, p. 48). 
This chapter compares three key areas of refugee policy. Government policy dealing with 
onshore asylum seekers, unlawful entrants and what are commonly termed 'boat people' will 
be explained, from the ALP's rejection of Cambodian asylum seekers in 1989, to the Coalition's 
implementation of the 'Pacific Solution' in 2001. Mandatory detention and how this policy has 
evolved and grown over time will be reviewed, with examples from the period under review 
used to highlight party policy comparisons. Finally, visa categories and the shifts that have 
occurred over the years will be looked at to highlight both the successes and failures on both 
sides of politics. 
This chapter is central to the thesis because it aims to specifically highlight the overall 
similarity in policy approaches across both major political parties. It seeks to display a high 
level of bipartisan support provided to policy even in direct contrast, at times, to party rhetoric 
in the media. In addition, this chapter compares examples of policy not only within the 
Australian political context, but also with international programs, cost benefit analysis and the 
social and legal impact of ALP and Coalition policy through its collapses and accomplishments. 
Australia's Unique Reaction to Boat People 
The Howard Coalition government (1996 - 2007) employed policies adhering to economic 
liberalism and social conservative values (Torrens, 2009). Liberal economic policies are 
displayed through an emphasis on free trade, privatisation and the efficiency of the capital 
markets. A higher level of skilled immigration is argued by business lobbyists to drive labour 
costs down and stimulate economic growth (Kabala, 1992, p. 17). Indeed, the case has been 
argued by both parties that increased immigration supplements and encourages job growth in 
Australia (Parkin & Hardcastle, 1994, p. 433). Skilled applicants are subjected to a point 
scheme, in which education levels, English literacy and capital wealth are weighted to 
determine suitability for entry under this stream of Australia's immigration target (Fitzgerald, 
1988, p. 86). 
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The Hawke and Keating ALP in comparison with the Howard Government displayed policies of 
compassionate social wellbeing and the opportunity for equity. 16 Lower immigration levels 
during periods of high unemployment have been the hallmark response by the ALP due to 
pressure from within its factions and from peak bodies such as the Australian Council of Trade 
Unions (ACTU) (Kabala, 1992, p. 11)17• This has been coupled with higher levels of family 
category quotas in times of economic stability and growth. The family category has witnessed 
a great deal of advocacy and support from the ethnic lobby (peak body- FECCA) of resettled 
migrants in Australia (Parkin & Hardcastle, 1994, p. 438). 
This being the case, the parties' divergence on levels of skilled verses family reunion intake is 
not replicated in the humanitarian or refugee scheme of immigration policy. As previously 
stated, both the ALP and the Coalition_ have maintained a commitment to international 
refugees since 1973 that approximately resides at ten per cent of the overall annual 
immigration intake. This figure has fluctuated with the overall intake increases and reductions; 
however the percentile has remained constant and enjoys unanimous bipartisan support 
(Parkin & Hardcastle, 1994, p. 440; see Table 3.1 below). 
Table 3.1 Overall Immigration I Humanitarian intake Ratio 
Year Overall annual Humanitarian Percentage of 
immigration intake component total 
1983 93 010 17 054 18% 
1984 68 820 14 769 21% 
1985 77 510 14 850 19% 
1986 92 590 11840 13% 
1987 113 540 11101 10% 
1988 143 480 11076 8% 
1989 145 320 10 887 7% 
1990 121230 11948 10% 
1991 121690 7 745 7% 
1992 107 391 7157 7% 
1993 76 330 10 393 14% 
1994 69 768 11350 16% 
1995 87 428 13 632 15% 
1996 99139 13 824 14% 
1997 85 752 9 886 12% 
16 In addition to social equality policies, Keating and Hawke deregulated wages, floated the dollar and 
reduced tariffs as part of ALP economic policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Anson, 1992, p. 151). 
17 This trend is also reflected today in immigration cuts under the Rudd Government's response to the 
present Global Financial Crisis by Immigration minister Chris Evans (Lunn, 2009). 
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1998 77 327 8 779 11% 
1999 84143 8 790 10% 
2000 92 272 7 267 8% 
2001 107 366 7 625 7% 
2002 88 900 6 732 8% 
Source: York, B (2003). DIM lA, Parliamentary Library, Social Policy Group. 
The philosophical differences outlined above have given way recently to partisan support that 
displays little to no difference in policy. Convergence between the major parties has been 
articulated as 'Tweedle Dee and Tweedle Dum' by some contemporary political scientists and 
is expressed in both economic and social policy agendas (Errington and van Onselen, 2007, p. 
123). Refugee policy has not escaped this trend. 
After Australia's accession to the 1951 Convention, the first major benchmark in refugee policy 
was the passage of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) which defines Australia's migration zone as: 
migration zone: means the area consisting of the States, the Territories, Australian 
resource installations and Australian sea installations and, to avoid doubt, 
includes: (a) land that is part of a State or Territory at mean low water; and (b) sea 
within the limits of both a State or a Territory and a port; and (c) piers, or similar 
structures, any part of which is connected to such land or to ground under such 
sea; but does not include sea within the limits of a State or Territory but not in a 
port. 
The Migration Amendment Act 2001 specifically removed Australian offshore islands from the 
legal term 'migration zone' which has implications for asylum seekers wishing to make a claim 
for refuge. This legislative change effectively provided the Commonwealth with another tool to 
deal with prospective immigrants without visas. Under the old legislation asylum seekers, most 
notably 'boat people' would be able to claim asylum and refugee status once land fall was 
reached on the Pacific and Indian Ocean Islands (specifically Ashmore Reef and Christmas 
Island). As a result of the 2001 amendments, these islands are now excised from the migration 
zone and separate from the general laws of the land (Crock & Saul, 2002, p.102; Mares, 2002, 
p.167). 
The Migration Amendment Act 2001 was coupled with a 'deter and deny' policy that was 
designed to be enforced by the Australian Defence Force and the Department of Immigration 
and Multicultural Affairs. The Royal Australian Navy was to physically deny suspected illegal 
entry vessels (SIEV) access to Australian territorial waters by means of refuelling and 
resupplying, ensuring the sea-worthiness of vessels and if need be towing them back out to 
sea and pointing them in the direction of Indonesia (Mares, 2002, p. 126). 
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Another amendment in 2001 to the Migration Act 1958 borderlines an infringement of our 
own pillar of democracy. The fundamental right of the judiciary to review and interpret 
legislation has been called into question with the circumscribing of refugees rights to have 
their case for asylum reviewed by the Federal Court in Australia. Maley (2002, p. 8) and Mares 
(2002, pp. 166 - 169) both articulate that the removal of access to this proceeding further 
limits refugee rights within the Australian context. This 'privative clause', initially embedded 
within the 1998 Judicial Review Bilt states that decisions reached by the Refugee Review 
Tribunal (RRT) 'must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in 
question in any court' (Mares, 2002, p. 162). This legislation may have been put in place to 
facilitate a quicker and more efficient processing of refugee cases for asylum (automation) 
which Maley and Mares fail to consider. However, it will lead to a less robust decision making 
process for refuge applications under the 1951 convention. 
The three factors highlighted so far, taken collectively, demonstrates the Howard 
government's response to an increase in onshore asylum seekers. These legislative, judicial 
and policy amendments have a common goal; to deter further attempts by asylum seekers to 
utilise the option of onshore processing. The majority of these amendments have been passed 
with bipartisan support. 
The drivers and concerns of Australia's border security during the Howard government tenure 
can be seen in realist terms that derive state sovereignty or national security as their principle 
focus. This of course, is in direct conflict with what Acharya (2008, p. 494) and Maley (2001, p. 
351) refer to as human security. The majority of scholarly debate in this field argues from a 
platform that places increased emphasis on the individual as opposed to the state (Mansbach, 
2008, pp. 84- 85; Spiegel, 2004, p. 38; Baylis, 2008, p. 445). 
The Coalition's policy position on border control in 2001 can be demonstrated by a broader 
analysis of democratic reaction and response to the AI Qaida high-jacking and ensuing 
asymmetrical warfare (Suter, 2008, p. 85). In an intuitive documentary, Noam Chomsky 
(Tetsujiro, 2002) offers his analysis of the events of September the eleventh (9/11) and their 
complications. He advocates that a natural reaction of power systems is to take advantage of 
such a catastrophic event. Advantage is gained by passing legislation that under normal 
circumstances would not pass public consensus and subsequently fail to pass through 
parliament or congress. He also summarises that the 'programs, often harsh and repressive 
programs', were already in place and the events of (9/11) did 'accelerate and intensify changes 
that were already underway'. Australia wasn't unique in its response to the events of 
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September eleven. Changes coexisted worldwide and included the USA PATRIOT Act (Suter, 
2008, p. 90), changes to Japan's constitution and Australia's introduction of the Border 
Protection Act 2001. All additional legislation saw further restrictions placed on individual 
liberties, and it is this fact that has impacted on refugee policy. As Mares (2007, p. 57) states, 
Coalition policy did not diverge or overturn from past policies, but moreover built on them 
with federal Opposition support. This body of analysis clearly links the Coalitions policy 
position to a western hemisphere's response for more robust national security. 
Australia's Treatment of Asylum Seekers- Mandatory Detention 
The opening of the Port Hedland detention centre in 1990 saw the beginning of Australia's 
mandatory detention policy for unlawful non citizens entering Australia without any 
accompanying documentation. This polh:y was a reactionary event to cover unauthorised 
arrivals from Cambodia that began arriving on the Western Australian coastline in 1990 (Jupp, 
2002, pp. 46 - 47). Labor's instigation of mandatory and irrevocable detention was supported 
by a range of ALP federal ministers at the time. Brennan (2003, p. 91), quotes a UNHCR 
executive committee conclusion; conclusion number forty-four states that there are instances 
that may require authorised detention in which 'people arriving have destroyed all 
documentation; there are good grounds for holding them in detention until their identities 
have been established and until health and security matters have been resolved'. Jupp (2003, 
p. 59) illustrates that the continuance of policy here has left the Coalition with a troubled 
legacy- a common perception of heartlessness and inhumanness. 
The dramatic increase in refugee intake from onshore arrivals has not been met with the 
benevolence of previous Coalition governments such as the Fraser government. In 1976 and 
1980 amnesties were provided for unlawful over stayers; however, this has been the exception 
to the rule, with no ALP or Coalition governments choosing this path since the Fraser 
Governments time in power ended in 1983. The expanding level of unlawful non citizens 
entering the country has required further areas for detaining asylum seekers whilst their 
claims for refugee status are processed. The Coalition's response before 2002 was to increase 
the number of detention centres on Australian soil. Therefore, Baxter (2002) and Woomera 
(1999) were created to deal with the increases in onshore arrivals. The Coalitions continuance 
of mandatory detention policy now diverges from the ALP on one considerable matter, that of 
fiscal responsibility and economic rationalism. Keating's reforms within the immigration 
department stressed economic rationality. The aim during the early 1990s was to generate a 
new self supportive department. Measures were introduced, such as the outsourcing of 
31 
services to other departments, utilising the immigration department's skill sets, that of 
interpretation and liaison and an airport departure tax, to raise revenue to offset the costs of 
mandatory detention and deportation. The new processors were expressed legally through 
two new Acts in 1991 and 199218 that captured the notion within the department that 'user 
pays' is the policy direction now in effect. These measures were backed with fees for English 
tuition, visa applications and appeal costs. The implementation of the 'Pacific solution' was not 
a cost effective measure and this policy was in direct contrast to Keating's reform measures. 
The retrospective legislation introduced in 200119 drew an expensive price tag for the 
Australian public (Brennan, 2003, p. 106). 
The fiscal year of 2001 to 2002 saw an increase of 159 million dollars to the department of 
immigration for the explicit purpose of dealing with onshore unlawful arrivals to Australia. The 
Coalition in addition saw fit to provide UNHCR and the International Organisation for 
Migration {10M) with additional funding to handle the management of offshore asylum seeker 
cases prior to their arrival in Australia's migration zone (Brennan, 2003, pp. 107 - 108). With 
further increases in budgetary allocations in the fiscal year 2002 to 2003, up to 240 million 
Australian dollars, clearly Coalition policy, continued from an ALP government has cost 
Australian's dearly in its detention of asylum seekers. 
Governments and Oppositions tend not to fight elections on this unfavourable ground. This 
adverse ground is what Sun Tzu (2003, p. 71) refers to as crossroad ground, 'ground that one 
should not attack on, either enemy or friendly force should contemplate action in these 
circumstances'. He advocates that this terrain is one on which neither side has a particular 
advantage and therefore it is mutually beneficial to avoid confrontation and to form alliances 
until more favourable terrain can be discovered. Policy agreement is explicitly demonstrated 
through Australia's actions towards onshore asylum seekers, loosely known as 'boat people'. 
Under the Hawke administration and his first Immigration Minister, Stewart West, refugee 
policy was adapted to allow entry to Chilean, Lebanese and El Salvadorian refugees to 
Australia. This was a result of hardening right wing regimes displacing citizens with opposing 
political views (Parkin & Hardcastle, 1990, p. 319). Australia adapted it's intake to cater for 
these minorities and the governing administration enjoyed strong Opposition support on the 
matter (Parkin & Hardcastle, 1990, p. 320). This opposition support is identified via two 
18 1991 and 1992 legislation: Immigration (Education) Charge Act 1992; Migration (Health Services) Charge 
Act 1991 
19 2001legislation: Border Protection Act 2001. 
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. editoria l articles (Pensabene, 1990, p. 2; Pensabene, 1993, p. 2) in which the Coalition firmly 
states its adoption of a bipartisan approach to immigration and refugee policy. In fact the 1990 
article is titled ' Immigration no longer divides the parties'. 
Internal 
Issue 
drivers 
Figure 3.1 Refugee Policy Drivers 
Budget Reviews 
Political 
Issue 
drivers 
Economy 
Media Attention 
External 
Issue 
drivers 
Under Minister Ray, the Immigration Minister from September 1988 until April 1990, the ALPs 
policy adapted in line with recommendations from the FitzGerald report published in 1988. 
Glyde Holding, Ray's predecessor, had commissioned a Committee to advise on Australia's 
immigration policies within a six month timeframe. Its terms of reference were broad and 
included; relationships between immigration and the economy, society and cultural 
development. They explicitly granted the committee the scope to look at Australia's capacity 
for significant intakes and key population issues (FitzGerald, 1988, p. ix) . The main outcome of 
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~his report for policy was to limit the capacity of decision makers to control bureaucratic 
decisions (automation), this process was to have minimal departmental interference and 
allowed the department to be less susceptible to external forces and ad hoc effects on short 
term decisions given the intense lobbying the department was capable of receiving. This 
revised rule-based system provided categories for immigrants that consisted of family reunion, 
skilled or humanitarian. The report called for increases across each category, but mainly a large 
increase in the economic and skilled category. Jupp (2002, p. 48) also draws out that the report 
was the precursor to a shift rational economic focus away from the more leftist humanist 
concerns previously adhered too. Jupp sees the realignment of the department over this 
period as a natural movement with the increasing consensus among public servants and 
bureaucrats of the time towards economic rationalism. With 'Economic Rationalism' 
providing the key catch phase of the reform, one may have expected the humanitarian 
element to suffer considerably. However, statistical data shows this not to be the case. The 
consecutive years 1990 and 1991 saw a sharp rise in the number of asylum seeker applications, 
from 12,128 to 16,743 with Australia accepting these additional numbers from UNHCR (UNHCR 
Statistical Online population database, 2009). So with a change in focus of immigration policy, 
refugees and those seeking asylum were not negatively affected under the ALP in the early 
1990s. 
Australia's Resettlement of Refugees 
Once asylum seekers have arrived in Australia, been processed by the authorities and then 
released into the community, they face additional challenges of resettlement in what is quite 
often a foreign culture. This policy thus provides a critical area worthy of further analysis in 
comparison of resettlement of refugees as permanent resettlement is the best possible 
outcome for asylum seekers. A study conducted in 2002 by James Bell (et al) assessed the most 
important factors for refugees returning to their original community of displacement are 
indicative of the nature of concerns for all refugees requiring resettlement. A simple yes - no 
dichotomy was used for data gathering by questionnaire of the problems of most concern to 
refugees in acquiring a stable and productive future. Ranked in order of importance (see Table 
3.2) these issues or problems consisted of availability of jobs- ranked first with eighty-five per 
cent of respondents listing thjs category as a serious problem. Ranked second was a natural 
progression of availability of money to buy goods - with eighty-two per cent listing this 
category as a serious problem. Thirdly, sufficient food supply was listed by seventy-five per 
cent of respondents as a serious problem. Down the list also came issues including; access to 
medical care, to education, to housing and to clean water supplies (Bell, 2008, p. 144). This 
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survey, although conducted on Afghani nationals in Pakistan refugee camps in 2002, outlines 
the main concerns that refugees face when considering resettlement or repatriation to their 
country of origin. 
Table 3.2 Relative levels of Concern for Refugees Requiring Resettlement 
Serial Rank Issue Per cent acknowledging 
serious problem 
1 2nd Money to buy goods 82% 
2 3rd Sufficient food supply 75% 
3 1st Availability of jobs 85% 
4 4th Access to medical care 45% 
5 6th Access to education 41% 
6 5th Adequate housing 43% 
7 ih Access to water 40% 
Source: Bell, J. et al (eds.). Statistical methods for Human Rights. Springer (2008). 
An analysis of ALP policy displays a range of reoccurring policy failures (Jupp, 1994, p. 38) that 
continued under the Coalition, which consequently failed to address these during its tenure in 
power. Firstly, policy under Hawke and Keating consisted of a tendency to treat refugee 
resettlement under the same banner as Non English Speaking Background (NESB) migrants 
that entered Australia under a skilled or family reunion visa. This approach fails to recognise 
the exposure to torture and trauma by refugees which necessitates further services often 
required, such as counselling and Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome (PTSS) management. Post 
the FitzGerald report, policy tended to outsource services in line with new economic 
management, through the Community Refugee Resettlement Scheme (CRRS) with Christian 
and Jewish welfare societies, together with state government departments bearing the brunt 
of resettlement services. Keating's reforms and budgetary cuts instigated a series of 
developments which included; the closing of reception centres, which previously facilitated 
information transfer and housing coordination, and excessive waiting periods for adult migrant 
English learning programs due to teacher shortages coupled with an increase in service 
demand. Jupp (1994, p. 59) also outlines the under recognised need for translators and mental 
health services personnel to deal with the trauma that refugees have often encountered on 
their path to resettlement. The main policy failures identified by Jupp are present and 
recognised by the survey conducted by James Bell in 2002. These as stated previously 
consisted of access to employment, or the need to provide an 'affirmative action' plan for 
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equal opportunity for refugees in employment and education, English speaking courses with 
interpreters for minority groups with remote dialects, lack of housing and medical resource 
information. 
Furthermore, Jupp {2003, p. 38} states that (although this time in a 2003 survey of ALP policy 
in opposition} there was a distinct lack of essential services (education, housing, medical and 
vocation opportunities} supplied by the federal Opposition ministers Simon Crean and Julia 
Gillard. He proposes that the ALP should support state government initiatives that combine job 
training and job placement for refugees at the very minimum. 
The Coalition's record is also worthy of further investigation for many desperate refugees. 
Phillips (2009, p. 15} notes that under the Howard administration there was an overt change in 
policy for potential refugees seeking asylum in Australia. Although recognised, UN Convention 
refugees were granted asylum, it was only temporary, as opposed to permanent, after new 
legislation enacted in 2001 by the federal government. Temporary Protection Visas (TPVs} 
were designed to provide adequate protection to refugees until their country of origin was 
deemed by Australian authorities as 'safe' to return to. TPVs did provide refugees with access 
to essential medical and welfare services; however, due to the temporary nature of the visa 
classification, access to resettlement services such as educational and employment facilities 
were denied. Similarly, restrictions to travel and family reunion were placed to TPV holders as 
these aspects were not deemed essential to their safety. The focus of this new policy was to 
remove the option of permanent resettling of refugees in Australia with the main emphasis 
now relying on a temporary 'safe haven' for individuals in need of protection. This policy drew 
large amounts of speculation form critics such as Myra White (2004, pp. 76 - 77}, who argue 
that receiving countries should be focusing on resettlement issues and not border protection 
as the Howard Government had done. This policy fails to address key issues highlighted in 
Bell's 2008 survey of Afghani refugees in Pakistan. Continuing on from the unsuccessful ALP 
policy, refugees are denied access to vocational institutional assistance, educational programs 
for long term security, and social/economic issues such as buying a home for future family 
security and stability. 20 
20 A note outside the scope of this study: the Rudd government has stopped the policy of issuing TPVs 
and refugees are now, once assessed on health and character, granted permanency {Evans, 2008, p.2). 
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To explain how and why the Coalition's policy is flawed, a comparison can be drawn here 
between temporary migrant workers on 457 category visas and TPV visa holders that is worthy 
of evaluation. Mares (2009, p. 1) sights the vulnerability of temporary work visa holders due to 
their dependence on Australian employers to continue their gainful employment within the 
specific industry. He specifically highlights the failure of current policy to address the 
vulnerable status of migrant workers seeking permanency in Australia. Mares (2009, p. 3) 
draws on the American political philosopher Walzer who advocates 'that anything short of 
permanent immigration is morally unacceptable'. Walzer argues that if citizens of Western 
nations bring in temporary labour schemes, then they must be willing to enlarge their 
membership to enable temporary residents' permanency after a period of employment 
providing constructive input to society. He equates temporary status working migrants with 
live-in-servants that establish a second class of citizens. On a moral plane, the same argument 
can be levelled at temporary protection of refugees. Although temporary protection has other 
facets, such as providing a 'safe haven' in times of international crisis (Kosovo); temporary 
entrants must have the ability to apply for permanency. This change in policy allows for the 
reward of financial and psychological investment, both by refugees and 457 migrant worker 
visa holders, in a future embedded within the Australian community. 
Additionally, comparison between Hawke's conciliation and placating of ethnic lobby groups 
and the resultant electoral success enjoyed by the ALP with Howard's adoption of policies 
courting disillusioned marginal workers back to the Coalition shows a similarity. Parkin & 
Hardcastle (1994, p. 438) argue that McAllister points out that the ethnic vote for Labor 
candidates is disproportionate in the 'Southern European vote'. McAllister (1988, pp. 11 - 15) 
argues that this vote swang national elections to victory (1983) that otherwise would have 
been lost. In contrast, the Coalition government's policy direction can be seen in the swing of 
the lower middle class worker, 'the Aussie Battler' back to the coalition in the 2001 election. 
Conclusion: 
The surprising extent of bipartisanship support for refugee policy in modern Australian politics 
is reflected throughout the nation's short accession to international refugee law since 1973. 
Consensus in policy formulation and execution has been widespread despite divergence in 
major party support bases and party rhetoric dispersed via the media. A note worthy 
inconsistency of fiscal irrationality displayed by the Howard administration as opposed to 
Keating's reforms for a user pay scheme pales in comparison to the list of similarities. This 
chapter demonstrates support exists across the array of policy issues with the continuance of 
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ongoing mandatory detention, a steady ten per cent quota for the humanitarian element of 
immigration policy, and delegation to state and local governments for refugee resettlement 
services. Even controversial legislation and amendments to existing Acts have been passed 
through Australia's rigorous parliamentary debate system with bipartisan support (minor 
parties aside). These included the global trend to strengthen border security procedures and 
assets under Howard's administration in 2001 and the provisional four year protection visas 
granted to Chinese students under Hawke in 1989. Collectively, whether failed or successful in 
its implementation, refugee policy has enjoyed long periods of bipartisanship support between 
1983 and 2007. 
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Conclusion 
The gradual increase in the number of people seeking asylum globally in recent years has been 
met by a similar increase in Australia's overall intake. It is a sign that despite public rhetoric 
about strong border protection, Australia has looked to meet its international obligations on 
refugee intakes. Regional push factors including statelessness, poverty, climate change and 
conflict, all continue to place Australia's refugee policy under significant strain, more so than it 
has previously been subjected to. Pressure for Australia to admit increasing numbers of bona-
fide refugees, from refugee advocate organisations, religious institutions, some academics and 
journalists, has not always reflected mass public opinion. This situation has put incumbent 
political parties in a difficult position from which to navigate the best public policy outcome. 
Political rhetoric has been one method politicians have used to bridge the gap between policy 
decisions and public attitudes. Government rhetoric, often expressed by the senior leadership 
of both the major Australian political parties, has often displayed traits that can be drawn from 
Australia's unique heritage and location. It has been subtly directed at gaining political mileage 
in backing a policy direction which is subsequently reflected at the ballot box. 
Reoccurring events illustrate how similar party responses are when the refugee issue is 
dragged into the public focus. Hawke's adamant repudiation of Cambodian asylum seekers in 
1990/91 as well as Keating's attack on their legitimacy is not that far removed from Howard's 
symbology and supporting rhetoric of a strong stance on border control. Additionally, the 
Opposition leader in 2006, Kim Beasley, supported the government's position on border 
control in his press statements with an additional commitment to increase Australia's bor6er 
protection with a bolstered coast guard. Recently we have seen the current Prime Minister, 
Kevin Rudd, sharpen his rhetoric on asylum seekers so as not to lose popularity on the back of 
some changes to processing conditions following his victory at the 2007 federal election. These 
examples draw attention to the political price tag of modern day policy delivery. The purpose 
of this method is to ensure party relevance at the electoral box by placating the party loyalists, 
whilst acknowledging the opinion of mainstream voting public, to. avoid elite criticism and to 
maintain Australia's international reputation for acceptance of refugees. 
Official government policy responses to regional developments have highlighted party strategy 
similarities. The response has been largely symmetrical. As an example of the affects that 
external influences have on refugee policy, the ALPs negotiation for the repatriation of 
Cambodian asylum seekers voiding the Cambodian Peace Plan highlights the government's 
focus on furthering its relations with ASEAN member states. Similarly, the Howard 
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administration's refusal to admit West Irian asylum seekers in 2006, due to Indonesian 
concerns incorporating its autonomy, is a showcase for the priority of foreign relations over 
and above humanitarian refugee policy outcomes. 
Further to external considerations, political aspects of policy warrant attention. The political 
fallout of unfavourable policy has the potential to unseat a government, especially in key 
marginal electorates. The federal incumbents' willingness to adhere to sound political 
decisions that maintain electoral viability is extremely similar. Howard's adoption of rhetoric 
that emphasised border control over humanitarian acceptance placated large sections of 
Australia's mainstream constituents. Coincidently, Hawke and Keating's placating of their 
union constituents saw overall quotas of refugees and immigration generally decline during 
Labor's period in power from 1983-1996 (although the relative margin still remained at ten per 
cent), in particular during tougher economic periods in Australia. Both examples highlight how 
politically astute leaders choose to adopt pragmatic refugee policies. 
Ultimately, the fiscal considerations of refugee policy are the most divergent between the 
parties. The largest divergence in policy is demonstrated by Keating's initiative for fiscal 
responsibility by individual government departments that adopted a 'user pays' system in 
contrast to Howard's all expenses paid off shore processing solution to increased levels of 
asylum seekers. This former policy digression is currently being eroded by the ALPs newly 
announced strategy in 2009, whereby it has been reported and coincidently not denied by the 
prime minister that Australia is compensating Indonesia financially for the processing of 
asylum seekers bound for Australia shores. 
The key results of this study have extrapolated three main outcomes. The current state of 
knowledge of the Coalition's refugee policy broadly reflected in academic literature and the 
media is at odds with the author's contention that Australian political parties are highly 
parallel in their refugee policy agenda. These policies are a kin in several ways such as; 
sustained levels of offshore refugee admittance through UNHCR processing facilities, 
mandatory detention for administration proposes and federal displacement of settlement 
services to state and local government areas of responsibility. Party rhetoric is also comparable 
and analogous. Case studies have displayed similar notions attached to partisan rhetoric that 
ring true for both ideological sides. It has been demonstrated that it is the audience that this 
rhetoric seeks to capture and inform that is of the most divergence. Prime ministerial 
leadership under both governments chose a pragmatic and realist approach to the delivery of 
refugee policy and its wholesale deliverance through related expression. 
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Continuity and divergence for the current administration, and how it adapts to the ever 
increasing number of refugees seeking assistance around the globe, will provide major 
challenges into the future. The change of federal government in November of 2007 has 
enabled the Coalition's policies to be considered in full in contrast to the Hawke/ Keating 
policies that concluded with Labor's tenure in 1996. At the height of public debate around 
asylum seekers and refugee treatment during the period from 1983 until 2007, government 
policy robustly enjoyed bipartisan support in 2001. Party policy agreement on this political 
issue predominantly escapes ideological differences and substitutes pragmatic policy for any 
convictional tendencies held by the immigration minister and their leaders. The continuance of 
bipartisanship demonstrated by parliamentarians under Hawke's decision to grant temporary 
visas to Chinese students in 1989 and Howard's stewardship of the MV Tampa incident in 2001 
are reminders of Sun Tzu's analogy. The Rudd Labor Government has continued the ten per 
cent quota for refugees as part of their immigration policy, utilised Christmas Island detention 
centre for refugee processing and mandatory detention, but additionally continues to down 
play any adverse rhetoric of too many asylum seekers landing on Australian territory to claim 
for refugee status. A further comparative study of the current administration may seek to add 
additional weight to the argument that Australian political parties are bipartisan in their 
approach towards refugee policy. One could conclude that this trend is continued as the major 
political parties contend for the same 'middle ground'. 
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